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INTRODUCTION
While questions of law, religion, and health care have engaged scholars, policy
makers, and the general public for decades, society continues to struggle over the
conflict between patient access to care and conscience-based objections to the
provision of care. To what extent can physicians, hospitals, or employers invoke
their faith to deny patients access to abortion, contraception, or end-of-life care that
will hasten death? What about denying fertility services to a same-sex couple? Or
when can parents refuse medical care for their children because of religious belieP
In this Article, I aim to articulate an overarching framework that can address
the balance between access to care and conscience-based objections to care in the
full range of situations in which the conflict between access and religious conscience
arises. In considering the different ways in which the conflict arises, I identify a key
principle-for issues in which conscience is important, religious objections to
providing care should be relevant only to the extent that there are legitimate

* Cobeaga Law Firm Professor, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law, and Co-Director, UNLV
Health Law Program. MD, JD, Harvard University. The theme of this Article developed from my
participation in the Law & Religion Roundtable, hosted by the UCI School of Law's Center for
Biotechnology & Global Health Policy on April 21-22, 2017, and I am grateful for the insights provided
by the other participants. I also am grateful for the research assistance of Lena Rieke and the editorial
assistance of the UC Irvine Law Review.
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nonreligious bases for refusing to provide care. Thus, for example, physicians
should be able to refrain from performing abortions or-from providing aid in dying'
on religious grounds because one can view abortion or aid in dying as immoral on
nonreligious grounds.
On the other hand, if we cannot find sufficient nonreligious reasons for
objecting to the care, then religious objections are insufficient as well. For example,
if principles of child abuse and neglect generally would prohibit parents from
rejecting a particular medical treatment for their children, then a parent's religious
beliefs would not justify an exemption from the obligation to agree to the treatment.
Parental religious beliefs should not permit a parent to refuse a polio vaccine or an
appendectomy for a child because there is no legitimate nonreligious reason for
rejecting ordinary medical treatments that can prevent death or other serious harm
to the child's health.
Are there any exceptions to the connection between religious reasons and
secular reasons? Are there times when one can invoke religious beliefs even when
there are no legitimate nonreligious bases for the exercise of conscience? If religious
freedom is measured in secular terms, then we could easily undermine the whole
idea of religious freedom.
While there can be circumstances outside of the delivery of health care for
recognizing religious beliefs that do not have a secular counterpart, it is difficult to
identify a situation in which a person's religious belief alone could justify the denial
of beneficial care. We should not allow religious doctrine to trump a person's
interests in health. In other words, even when someone has a valid free exercise
interest, the state's interest in protecting the health of its citizens outweighs the
religious interest.
Requiring a corresponding secular justification before recognizing a religious
justification also reflects the important principle of government neutrality with
respect to religion. Under the First Amendment's free exercise clause, the
government may not disfavor religion, but under the First Amendment's
establishment clause, the government also may not favor religion. If religious
justifications were allowed in the absence of a corresponding secular justification,
then religion would be singled out for preferential treatment. For example, if we
think a person's conscientious objection to war should qualify as an exemption from
military service, then secular moral objections should count just as much as religious
objections. Indeed, one qualifies for conscientious-objector status under the U.S.
military draft if one "is opposed to serving in the armed forces and/or bearing arms
on the grounds of moral or religious principles." 2

1. Aid in dying is described by some observers as physician-assisted suicide. Aid in dying also
can include euthanasia.
2.
Conscientious Objection andAlternative Service, SELECTIVE SERV. Sys., https://www.sss.gov/
consobj [https://perma.cc/GMN7-Z24Q] (last visited July 7,2018). For an extended discussion of the
view that secular moral views deserve the same consideration as religious moral views, see BRIAN
LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION (2013). While secular moral views are given the same respect
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I. INVOKING RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS To HEALTH CARE

A. The Convergence of the Sectarian with the Secular
When religious objections to health care are raised, we might invoke a few
considerations. For example, is the objection rooted in belief or conduct? As the
Supreme Court observed in Employment Division v. Smith, the state may not regulate
3
religious belief but it may regulate religious practice. Thus, for example, while the
First Amendment prevents government from punishing religious adherents who
express a belief in child sacrifice, it is permissible for the state to punish a religious
adherent who practices child sacrifice.
This distinction between belief and practice makes a good deal of sense, and
it appears as well in the Court's doctrine for the First Amendment's right to freedom
of speech. While people generally cannot be punished because of their advocacy for
unlawful conduct, they can be punished when their speech crosses the line between
4
advocacy and action.
This is not to say that the state can freely regulate religious practice. At some
point, regulation of religious practice can too greatly interfere with religious
freedom, as for example, when government requires all children to attend school
until age sixteen.

5

Since denials or refusals of health care would constitute conduct, rather than

only expressions of religious belief, they are potentially subject to regulation as
religious practice. That takes us to the question of how to distinguish between
permissible and impermissible regulation of religious practice.
In deciding when regulation of practice is permissible, a key factor is whether
the state is singling out a practice for regulation because of its religious nature, or
whether the state is regulating the practice in both sectarian and secular contexts

because of nonreligious concerns associated with the practice. In Church of the
Lukumi BabaluAye v. City of Hialeah, the Court struck down Hialeah, Florida's ban
on animal sacrifice because the city's animal killing ordinances permitted a variety
of animal slaughters and only prohibited animal killing by a particular religious
6
denomination as part of the denomination's religious practice. In Smith, on the
other hand, the Court permitted Oregon to penalize peyote use in a religious setting
because its prohibition of peyote use applied broadly and did not specifically target
the use of drugs for religious purposes.7 Under Smith's relatively deferential view of

as sectarian views by the Selective Service System and under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, other federal statutes do not treat secular moral views the same as religious beliefs. Friedman

v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 102 Cal. App. 4th 39, 50-66 (2002).
3. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990).
More specifically, if advocacy is likely to incite imminent illegal conduct, then it can be
4.
punished. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1375-76 (5th ed. 2017).

5.

See generaly Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (permitting Amish families to decline

high school education for their children).

6.
7.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1993).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80.
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state authority to regulate religious practice, the First Amendment right to practice
one's religion does not give someone an exemption from laws that treat the secular
and the sectarian equally.8 Thus, if the law prohibits the denial of health care to a
patient or a child because of the importance of access to care, then religious belief
would not justify an exemption for a doctor or parent to withhold or refuse care.
To be sure, the Smith decision was controversial. Many Americans on both
sides of the political spectrum felt that the Court gave insufficient regard to religious
freedom.9 As a result, Congress and many states responded to the Court's decision
in Smith by giving greater protection to religious practice than provided by the First
Amendment.1 0 Under federal and state religious freedom restoration acts (RFRAs),
as well as many state constitutional provisions, the government is subject to a strict
standard when laws interfere with religious practice even when the laws
evenhandedly regulate religious and nonreligious conduct. The state must show that
its regulation serves a "compelling" governmental interest and that the regulation is
"the least restrictive means" for achieving the interest."
But the greater protections do not change the balance between state authority
and religious freedom in the context of denying health care to a patient. In the case
of denials of health care on religious grounds, the state has a compelling interestensuring that patients have access to care that will promote their well-being.1 2 As
with other fundamental rights, the right to religious freedom is subject to limitation
when other key interests are at stake.13
While the existence of important public interests may justify limits on religious
freedom in some cases, so may they reinforce the right to religious freedom in other
cases. Many religious principles have secular moral counterparts. For example,
murder violates both the Ten Commandments and secular legal codes. Similarly,
theft, trespass, and fraud violate both religious and nonreligious legal codes. The
government has a strong interest in recognizing claims of religious conscience when
analogous claims can be made based on important secular moral values. Hence,
obstetricians with religious objections to abortion may refrain from performing

8.
9.

Id. at 879.
Scott Bomboy, What Is RFRA and Why Do We Care?, CONST. DAILY (June 30, 2014),

https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/what-is-rfra-and-why-do-we-care/?mobr=1

[https://perma.cc/

3GXD-G73K].
10.

Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clauses,

57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 66-67 (1996).
11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(b) (West 1993); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15 (2015);
VA. COnE ANN. 5 57-2.02(B) (2014). There also is a federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) that essentially acts as a RFRA for prisoners, mental health patients, and zoning

decisions. 42 U.S.C. 55 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
12. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 43 (D.D.C. 2012) (observing that "the Government
clearly has a compelling interest in safeguarding the public health").

13.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
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abortions, just as obstetricians with nonreligious objections may refrain from
performing abortions.14
A final potential factor might be whether the religious objection is made by
individuals or by institutions, such as hospitals or corporations. Many observers
have argued that persons can practice religion, but entities cannot, and that
therefore it doesn't make sense to talk about the practice of religion by an inanimate
organization.' 5 So, for example, an employer should not be able to deny access to
contraception in its employee health-care plan on the ground that the company has
religious objections to contraception.
In Bunrell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Supreme Court rejected the individualentity distinction,1 6 and that makes good sense. Organizations are expected to have
mission statements and be good corporate citizens. Rather than pursuing only the
narrow self-interests of their entities, they should be socially conscious and promote
broader public interests, such as by adopting policies that protect against climate
change or by contributing to charitable causes in their communities. If we think that
organizations should take important values into account in their operations, it would
be wrong to allow them to pursue important secular values but not important
religious values.17 That would be akin to the targeting of religious practice in Church
of Lukumi Babalu Aye rather than the neutral treatment of religion in Smith.
This is not to say that corporate religious claims always should prevail. Just as
individual claims of religious freedom must yield to important public interests, so
must corporate religious claims. In the Hobby Lobby case, for example, the Court's
willingness to recognize the interest of employers in not providing contraceptive
coverage to their employees was contingent on the fact that the government or the
employers' health insurance providers would ensure that employees had full access
to contraceptives.'

In sum, the First Amendment permits government to regulate religiouslybased conduct when it regulates similar nonreligious conduct, as long as the
government does not target religious practice for disfavored treatment. Religious
freedom statutes and state constitutional provisions provide greater protection for
religious practice, but they still permit government to regulate religiously-based
conduct as long as the government can invoke a sufficiently important public

14. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2000) (prohibiting mandates to perform an abortion when
doing so would be contrary to the physician's "religious beliefs or moral convictions").
15. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277, 28182 (2015) (observing that religious liberty "is meant to protect uniquely human attributes"); see also
Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1538-45 (2012) (critiquing the
concept of institutional conscience).
16. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767-75 (2014). The Hobby Lobby
case involved challenges by three businesses to the contraceptive mandate under the Affordable Care
Act. Regulations adopted to implement the Act required employer-provided health insurance to include
coverage for contraceptives. Id. at 2762.
17. Id. at 2771.
18. Id. at 2760.
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interest for the regulation.' 9 As mentioned, when the law rejects religious arguments
for the denial of care, it is invoking a sufficiently important governmental interestthe compelling state interest in access to health care. On the other hand, when an
important secular value parallels the asserted sectarian value, the law will be more
protective of religiously-based conduct.20 Overall, the balance among religious
values, secular values, and the public interest allows for principles of law, religion,
and health care that protect both religious liberty and other important interests.
In the next few sections of this Article, I will illustrate the application of these
principles to different ways in which religious belief leads to the denial of health
care. I will start with the right of parents to refuse treatment for their children.
B. ParentalRefusals of Treatmentfor Children
Religious beliefs may lead people to reject medical treatment. For example,
Jehovah's Witnesses refuse blood transfusions, 2 1 and Christian Scientists refuse a
range of medical care. 22 Can parents refuse blood transfusions or other lifesustaining treatment for their children?
In answering that question, it is useful to begin with the right of parents to
refuse unwanted medical care for themselves. On that question, the common law
and constitutional doctrine come to the same conclusion: People may refuse
undesired medical care, even if the care is necessary to prolong life. 23 The state's
interest in preserving life yields to the individual's interests at stake-the common
law right to accept or refuse recommended treatment (the doctrine of informed
consent), 24 the substantive due process right to avoid unwanted bodily intrusions, 25
26
and the First Amendment right to freedom of religion.
For example, in its cases involving the right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining
medical care, the New Jersey Supreme Court has cited common law principles of
28
informed consent,27 the federal constitutional right of privacy, and the New Jersey
29
constitutional right of privacy. In its life-sustaining medical care case, the U.S.
Supreme Court connected common law principles of informed consent to
constitutional due process rights and also discussed the importance of First
30
Amendment rights.

19. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
20. See supra text accompanying note 14.
21. Dena S. Davis, Does 'No' Mean 'Yes'? The Continuing Problem of Jebovah's Witnesses and
Refusal of .Blood Products, SECOND OPINION, Jan. 1994, at 34.
22. Janna C. Merrick, SpiritualHealing, Sick Kids, and the Law: Inequities in the American Health
Care System, 29 AM.J.L. & MED. 269, 271-72 (2003).
23. MARK A. HALL ET AL.,.HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHIcs 517-18 (9th ed. 2018).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. In re Brooks' Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965).
27. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221-22 (N.J. 1985).
28. Id. at 1222-23.
29. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270, 277-79 (1990).
30.
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Importantly for purposes of this Article, the broad right to refuse treatment
exists whether the reason for the refusal is based in religion or in nonreligious
concerns, such as concern about the risks of treatment or a commitment to herbal
medicine. 31 That the patient refusing treatment invokes religious reasons does not
32
make the right any stronger than if the patient invokes nonreligious reasons. In
other words, the right to refuse treatment rests on alternative secular and sectarian
constitutional grounds, and either one alone is sufficient. The religious right
parallels the secular right.
While adults enjoy an unlimited right to refuse treatment for themselves, their
right to decide is limited when exercised on behalf of their children. Parents
generally have authority to make medical decisions for their children, but not to
refuse care that provides great benefit.33 As courts have observed, parents may
make martyrs of themselves, but not of their children. 34 If a refusal of care would
35
constitute child abuse or neglect, the state may prohibit the refusal. And here too,
the sectarian right parallels the secular right. It would not matter under common
law or constitutional principles whether the parental refusal was based on religious
or nonreligious reasons.
It is not surprising that parental rights to refuse treatment are not affected by
religion. The Supreme Court has long recognized a substantive due process right of
parents to make decisions about the raising of their children, 36 so the state needs to
invoke a very strong interest to intrude on parental decision-making. If the state's
interest is strong enough to outweigh parents' due process rights, it is strong enough
to outweigh their free exercise rights. More specifically, the state's interest in
protecting children from abuse or neglect is important enough to outweigh either a
parent's child-rearing rights or the parent's religious rights. As the Supreme Court
has observed, the state's interest in protecting child welfare "is not nullified merely
because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on
religion or conscience." 37 Or as Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin have

31. In some cases, a patient will invoke both religious and nonreligious reasons. For example,
in Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990), the patient objected to a blood transfusion because
she was a Jehovah's Witness and also because of the risk of contracting AIDS or other communicable
diseases.
32. Whether or not the patient invokes religious reasons may affect assessments of the patient's
decision-making capacity. When a patient refuses medical care, we want to make sure that the refusal
reflects a genuine expression of the patient's self-determination, and the kinds of reasons given by the
patient are part of the assessment of decision making capacity. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 413
n.7 (N.J. 1987) (referring to the competent patient's "capacity to reason and make judgments").
HALL ET AL., supra note 23, at 575.
33.

34. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560,
590 (Wis. 2013).
35. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 609.378 (West 2017) (defining as unlawful neglect of a child
parental deprivation of health care).

36. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
37. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
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observed, the right to practice one's religion should not give one the right to inflict
harm on one's children. 38
And note that child abuse and neglect law has drawn a balance between
parental interests and state interests that is very solicitous of parental interests,
including religious interests. Courts generally do not override parental refusals of
medical care unless the benefit to the child is substantial, as with antibiotics for
pneumonia or surgery for appendicitis. 39 When the benefits are uncertain or the
burdens of treatment significant, courts often will defer to parental judgment.40
In addition, if the First Amendment were to recognize a religious exemption
from child abuse laws, it would raise serious establishment clause concerns.
Government may not disfavor religion, but it also may not favor religion. A religious
exemption from child abuse law would have the effect of the law being guided by
religious doctrine.
To be sure, most states provide exemptions in their child abuse and neglect
laws for parents who refuse medical treatment on religious grounds. 41 But courts
often read the exemptions narrowly, relying on a couple of theories. First, many of
the exemptions state that parents cannot be held accountable "solely" for relying
on prayer, or for relying on prayer "alone," rather than on medical care, so liability
can be upheld on the ground that the charges are brought because of the harm
rather than because of the use of prayer. 42 In addition, the exemptions typically
apply to child and abuse laws but not so often to other laws under which parents
may be held accountable, such as involuntary manslaughter statutes. 43 And of
course, the exemptions speak to the ability of the state to punish parents. Even if a
court cannot sanction the parents, it still may order that treatment be provided to

38.

Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basisfor Harming Others: Review

Essay of Paul A. Offit's Bad Faith: When Religious Belief Undermines Modern Medicine, 104
GEO. LJ. 1111, 1128-29 (2014).
39.

HALL ET AL., supra note 23, at 575.

40.

See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991) (upholding parental refusal of

chemotherapy for child given the substantial risks of treatment and the less than fifty percent chance
of success); In re Nicholas E., 720 A.2d 562 (Me. 1998) (permitting mother to refuse aggressive antiviral
drug therapy to treat HIV infection in her four-year-old son); In re Martin F., 820 N.Y.S.2d 759
(Sup. Ct. 2006) (deferring to parent's refusal of antipsychotic drug for three-year-old child). Other
courts will override parental decisions, as in In re Cassandra C., 112 A.3d 158 (Conn. 2015) (mandating

treatment for Hodgkin's lymphoma); In re Gianelli, 834 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (denying parents'
request to withdraw ventilator from a fourteen-year-old child who had a lethal genetic disease and a life
expectancy of no more than two years but who was still "aware and enjoy[ed] TV and videos").
41.
Aleksandra Sandstrom, Most States Allow Relegious Exemptions from Child Abuse and
Neglect Laws, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/
12/most-states-allow-religious-exemptions-from-child-abuse-and-neglect-laws/
[https://perma.cc/

D7Q6-4VGP].
42. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 864 (Cal. 1988); In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271,
274-75 (Colo. 1982).
43. State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560, 576 (Wis. 2013); see also Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433,
435 (Ind. 1986) (holding that parents are protected from prosecution under the child neglect statute
when their children suffer serious bodily injury from being treated with prayer, but are not protected
from prosecution under the reckless homicide statute if their children die).
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the child.44 Indeed, the federal regulation that led to the adoption of the religious
exemptions explicitly drew a line between holding parents liable and ensuring access
to care for children. The regulation, which is no longer in effect, tied federal funding
for child abuse programs to the enactment of religious exemptions. 45 But the
regulation also stated that the exemptions "shall not preclude a court from ordering
that medical services be provided to the child, where his health requires it."46 And
state law exemptions typically track this requirement. 47
Not punishing parents while ensuring that care is provided might seem to be
a useful way to draw the balance between religious freedom and child health. Such
a balance protects parents from a government that might be overzealous in its
efforts to protect child welfare and is not sufficiently sensitive to First Amendment
concerns. And at the same time that religious belief is protected, the power for
courts to order medical services should protect the health of children. In practice,
however, the judicial power to order treatment appears not to be providing adequate
protection for children. 48

C

ProviderDenials of Care

Just as religious rights parallel nonreligious rights of parents to refuse medical
care for children, so do religious rights parallel nonreligious rights on the question
whether a doctor or other provider can deny medical care to patients. In cases in
which providers can deny care, the freedom to do so exists for both religious and
nonreligious reasons, and in cases in which providers cannot deny care, religious
justifications fail when there are not valid secular reasons for denying care.

1. Abortion andAid in Dying
Two leading examples of areas where providers can deny care are abortion
and aid in dying. While the Constitution guarantees a right to abortion for pregnant
women in all states, 49 and several states guarantee a right to aid in dying for
terminally ill patients,50 no doctor or hospital is required to provide abortion or aidin-dying services.51 For reasons of conscience, doctors and hospitals may decline to
participate in either practice.
44. ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, CHILD MALTREATMENT AND THE LAW 75 (2008).
45. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1975), cited in Wayne F. Malecha, Faith Healing Exemptions to
Child Protection Laws: Keeping the Faith Versus Medical Carefor Children, 12 J. LEGIS. 243, 247 n.42
(1985).
46. Id.
47. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 38, at 1125-28.
48. See Seth M. Asset & Rita Swan, Child Fatalitiesfrom Religion-MotivatedMedical Neglect, 101
PEDIATRICS 625 (1998).
49. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
50. See Ryan P. Clodfelter & Eli Y. Adashi, The Liberty to Die: CalforniaEnacts PhysicianAidin-Dying Law, 315 JAMA 251 (2016).
51. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.14(e) (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2548-117(1) (West 2016); D.C. Code Ann. § 7-661.10(a) (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.885(4) (2017);
18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5285(A) (2013); WASH. REV. CODE 5 70.245.190(1)(d) (2009); Mark
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And this is true regardless of whether the reasons of conscience are rooted in
religious doctrine or nonreligious morals. For either sectarian or secular reasons,
many people consider abortion or aid in dying murder, and the law respects the
freedom of health-care providers to refrain from practices that they view as
murderous. Rights to abortion or aid in dying are rights for willing patients and
willing providers. Neither patient nor physician can be forced to participate.
Thus, for example, in New Jersey, a "refusal to perform . .. or provide
abortion services . .
shall not constitute grounds for civil or criminal liability,
disciplinary action or discriminatory treatment." 52 And under the Church
Amendment, Congress has stated that receipt of federal funds "does not
authorize any court or any public official" to require an individual to perform
abortions or a facility to make its facilities for abortions if doing so "would
be contrary to ...
religious beliefs or moral convictions." 53 Similarly, under
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, "[n]o health care provider shall be under any
[legal] duty ... to participate in the provision . . of medication to end [a patient's]
life." 54 In none of these statutory provisions does the law qualify its protections on
the basis of religion. Whether for secular or sectarian reasons, physicians may refuse
to participate in abortion or aid in dying.55
It is not surprising that religious freedom would parallel secular freedom.
Religious law and secular law reflect common values in many areas, not only with
laws against murder, but also with laws against robbery, assault, trespass, or fraud.
Religious law seeks to promote fundamental values, and so does secular law.
Accordingly, providers of health care with religious objections to abortion or aid in
dying can appeal to their religious beliefs, but they don't have to do so.
While it is clear that physicians, hospitals, or other providers can refuse to
participate in abortion or aid in dying, it is not clear where the line should be drawn
between participation and nonparticipation. A doctor who performs an abortion is
a participant, as is the clinic or hospital where the abortion is performed. But what
of the pharmacist who fills prescriptions for a pregnant woman so she can use the
drugs mifepristone and misoprostol for a medical abortion? Similarly, a physician
who writes a prescription for a lethal dose of a drug participates in aid in dying, but
what of the pharmacist who fills the prescription? What level of involvement makes
a physician or other provider of care morally complicit in abortion or aid in dying?
As with other line-drawing questions in law, the line between participation and
nonparticipation is difficult to define. People can facilitate and thereby be complicit

L. Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not to Participate in .Abortions: Roe, Casey, and the Fourteenth
Amendment Rzghts of HealthcareProviders, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30-35 (2011).
52.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:65A-3 (2017).
53.
42 U.S.C. 5 300a-7(b)(1)-(2) (2012).

54.

OR. REV. STAT. 127.885(4) (2017).

55.
Sepper, supra note 15, at 1549-50. For additional discussion of statutory provisions that
recognize exercises of conscience, see id. at 1509-14; Lynn D. Wardle, Protection of Health-Care
Providers' Rights of Conscience in American Law: Present, Past, and Future, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1

(2010).
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in an action in many ways and at different levels of involvement. At some point, the
connection becomes so tenuous that complicity is no longer present. But there is
no clear distinction between participation and nonparticipation, and reasonable
people can disagree as to where the line lies. Thus, for example, some states require
pharmacies to fill prescriptions for abortion medications even when the owner of
the pharmacy objects to abortion while other states allow pharmacies or pharmacists
to not fill prescriptions for abortion medications when they have moral objections
to abortion.56
Nevertheless, the line between participation and nonparticipation should be
the same whether objections to abortion or aid in dying are rooted in religious or
nonreligious morals. Degrees of complicity do not vary because one has sectarian
rather than secular reasons for viewing abortion or aid in dying as murder.
Moreover, there is an important benefit if questions such as the degree of
complicity for religious belief can be judged in secular terms. It is difficult for a
judge to assess the sincerity of a religious belief or the legitimacy of a religious belief.
Analyzing complicity in secular terms allows a court to give due regard to religious
57
beliefs without having to make religious judgments.

2. Fertiity Services
Abortion and aid in dying illustrate health-care services where both secular and
sectarian objections are important enough to overcome the individual interest in
access to care. There also are health-care services for which neither secular nor
sectarian objections outweigh the interest in access to health care, and for these
health services too, the sectarian parallels the secular. Taking account of religious
belief should not change the analysis.
For example, cases have arisen in which a same-sex couple wants to have a
child, seeks care from a physician who provides assisted-reproduction services, and
the physician refuses to provide care on the ground that children should be raised
by a father and mother. While physicians ordinarily are free to choose their patients,
antidiscrimination statutes prohibit some reasons for refusing to provide care. So,
for example, a physician cannot refuse to provide care because of the patient's race

56.
R. Alta Charo, The CelestialFire of Conscience - Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2471, 2472 (2005). Some of the laws apply to prescriptions in general, while others are

limited to abortion, contraception, and/or aid in dying. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-203, -215
(2017) (allowing health care providers, including health care facilities, not to comply with a patient's
medication choices); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2018) (allowing pharmacists not to fill
prescriptions for medications that will be used for abortion or aid in dying).
57. Judges often end up making unfair distinctions among different religious claims, giving
greater weight to claims made by adherents to mainstream religions. Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2587
(2015). Courts also may be unduly deferential to claims based on religion. Samuel J. Levine, A Critique
of Hobby Lobby and the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. ONLINE 26, 31 (2015).
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or sex.58 And in some states, a physician cannot refuse to provide care on account
of a patient's sexual orientation.59 When a fertility specialist who objects to
procreation by same-sex couples is subject to an antidiscrimination statute, the
physician might claim that the statutory duty to treat violates the First Amendment
right to religious freedom.
In such cases, the First Amendment argument should fail, and the statutory
protection should prevail, as held by the California Supreme Court.60 One's freedom
of religion should not grant an exemption from the duty not to discriminate when
treating patients.
And this makes good sense. These cases are unlike the refusals to perform an
abortion or provide aid in dying in that there is no legitimate secular basis for
denying fertility services to same-sex couples, or at least not a reason that is
important enough to outweigh the couple's fundamental interest in having and
raising children, as well as the couple's fundamental interest in being treated equally
by others. 6' Objections to the raising of children by same-sex couples are rooted in
a belief that children should be raised by a mother and father or in moral disapproval
of homosexuality, 62 but neither reason is sufficient. Children raised by same-sex
couples fare well in terms of their educational achievement and psychological wellbeing. They do -as well as children raised by opposite-sex couples. 63 And as the
Supreme Court has recognized, moral disapproval alone is not a sufficient basis for
overriding important individual interests. 64
So the denial of fertility services is another example of a denial of medical care
where theanalysis for sectarian reasons parallels the analysis for secular reasons. For
both religious and nonreligious objectors to the provision of services, the objections

58.

Sandra H. Johnson, The ACA's Provision on Nondiscrimination Takes Shape, HASTINGS

CTR. REP., Sept/Oct. 2016, at 5.
59.

One

can argue that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation constitutes

discrimination on the basis of sex. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation constitutes discrimination on the basis
of sex for purposes of Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans discrimination in
employment). If that argument gains acceptance, then protections against discrimination would exist

widely.
60.

N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008)

(rejecting a religious belief exception to California's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation). In a Minnesota case, however, the court did not apply the state's anti-discrimination

statute. Court Order, Beatty v. Erhard, No. PI 95-4965 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 1995), discussed in Holly
J. Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artiicial
Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173, 207-12 (1996).
61.
Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 57, at 2588.
62.
Lynn D. Wardle, Preference for Marital-Couple Adoption-Constitutional and Poliy
Reflections, 5J.L. & FAM. STUD. 345, 377-80, 384-85 (2005). Arguments against parenting by same-sex
couples also rested on the importance for children of being raised by married rather than unmarried
couples, id. at 369-77, but the legalization of same-sex marriage has addressed that concern.

63.

Wendy D. Manning, Marshal Neal Fettro & Esther Lamidi, Child Well-Being in Same-Sex

Parent Families: Review of Research Preparedfor American Sociological Association Amicus Brief 33

POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REv. 485 (2014).
64. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 577-78 (2003).
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rest on misunderstandings of childrearing or in moral disapproval, and as indicated,
such objections do not justify overriding a couple's important interests in having
children and being treated equally.
While I have focused on fertility services because that is where cases have
arisen in recent years, the analysis would be the same for other kinds of medical
care. A person's interest in receiving health care is too important to let it be blocked
by the moral disapproval of physicians or other providers of health care.
III. WHEN LAW SHOULD RESPECT THE SECTARIAN THAT DIVERGES FROM THE
SECULAR

I have argued that religious objections to health care should be respected to
the extent that secular objections to care are respected and that doing so permits
the state to give due protection to both sectarian belief and the public's well-being.
While that may seem to make religious freedom irrelevant, it does not. Religious
freedom is a fundamental right, but even fundamental rights can be limited on
behalf of important interests.65 The connection between secular and sectarian values
says more about the importance of health care than about the importance of
religious freedom.
Outside of the delivery of health care, there are times when one's religious
beliefs should be given special consideration. Two important circumstances involve
activities that have intrinsic religious significance or activities for which there are
not important public interests at stake.

A. Activities with Intrinsic Religious Signficance
Religious belief may deserve special consideration for activities that have
intrinsic religious significance. For example, the impetus to enactment of religious
freedom restoration acts came from Oregon's penalties for peyote use during
religious services. 66 Similarly, when alcoholic beverages were banned during the
Prohibition Era, an exception was made for sacramental wine. 67 In the public's view,
it is important to ensure that traditional religious practice with controlled substances
be permitted even when controlled substance use is not permitted for secular
reasons.
The intrinsic religious significance principle not only ensures that people can
engage in activities that otherwise would be forbidden. It also applies when a person
does not want to participate in an activity that has religious significance because the
activity violates the person's religious scruples. For example, a minister may refuse

65. Thus, for example, states may invoke their interest in potential life to prohibit abortion once
the fetus is viable. Planned Parenthood v. Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); see also supra text
accompanying note 13.
66. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S 872, 874 (1990).
67. Volstead Act, ch. 85, tit. I, sec. 3, 41 Stat. 305 (1920); Jack S. Blocker, Jr., Did Prohibition
Really Work?: Alcohol Prohibition as a Public Health Innovation, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 233, 237
(2006).
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to officiate at a same-sex wedding that would be prohibited by the minister's
religion. Even though moral disapproval alone is not a basis for a physician to deny
fertility services to a same-sex couple, the minister's moral disapproval alone is
sufficient to justify a refusal to officiate at a wedding or to provide other religious
services.
Of course, there is much debate about what it means to participate in a
religious activity such as a wedding. While a consensus seems to exist that ministers
participate when they officiate at a wedding and that the electric utility does not
participate when it provides power to the wedding hall, people disagree about
wedding photographers, florists, caterers, and musicians. Some providers of
wedding services draw a distinction between providing their services to a same-sex
couple for nonreligious events, such as birthday parties or holiday receptions, and
providing their services for a wedding, which they see as a religious activity that is
inconsistent with their religious beliefs. 68 In response to these providers, others do
not see the provision of services as akin to participating in a religious activity. It
appeared that the Supreme Court would provide greater clarity on where the law
should draw the line between participation and nonparticipation when it was asked
to decide whether a bakery can refuse to create a wedding cake for a same-sex
wedding. 69 However, the Court decided the case on narrow procedural grounds
70
leaving for a later day the larger questions in the case.
While the intrinsic religious significance principle is important, it does not
change the analysis for denials of health care on religious grounds. Since providing
health-care services does not involve participating in a religious activity, the freedom
to not participate in religious activity would not justify a doctor's refusal to provide
health care or a parent's rejection of health care for a child.
Similar to the principle that religious beliefs should be given special
consideration in the context of religious activity is the principle that religious beliefs
should be given special consideration in the internal operations of a house of
worship. Religious liberty would be greatly threatened if government could interfere
with the governance decisions of a church, synagogue, or mosque. Thus, for
example, courts will not invoke antidiscrimination statutes to interfere with the
decision of a church to fire a pastor (the "ministerial exception").71
But as with activities with intrinsic religious significance, protection for the
internal operations of a house of worship does not affect the analysis for denials of
health care. The delivery of health care is not a feature of the internal operations of
a house of worship.
68. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276-77 (Colo. App. 2015); Elane
Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61 (N.M. 2013).
69. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
70. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018)
(reversing the state civil rights commission's finding against the bakery because the commission's
"treatment of [the] case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere
religious beliefs" of the baker).
71. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
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B. Activities that Don't Compromise Important Public Interests
As discussed, religious values have the same effect as secular values as a basis
for objecting to the delivery of health care because of the importance of health care.
Similarly, religious belief no more than secular belief should qualify as an exemption
to the requirements of antidiscrimination law because of the importance of equality.
But there are many settings in which religious practice does not conflict with
72
an important public interest. Consider, for example, the case of Holt v. Hobbs. In
that case, a Muslim prisoner challenged a prison rule that prevented him from
growing a half-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs. While the
Department of Correction invoked the important interests in prison safety and
security to justify its facial-hair policy, it could not show that its beard ban actually
served the asserted interests. 73 Wearing a half-inch beard would not compromise
the safety or security of the prison. Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
the ban violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA). 74
In another case, Old Order Amish defendants were charged with violations of
a traffic safety regulation. Under Minnesota law, slow-moving vehicles were
required to display a fluorescent orange-red triangle when being driven on the state's
public highways. 75 The Amish objected on the ground that their religion prohibited
76
the display of "loud colors" and "worldly symbols." Relying on the Minnesota
Constitution's religious freedom provision, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the Amish's alternative safety measures for their horse-drawn buggies-silver
reflective tape and lighted red lanterns-were adequate substitutes for the
fluorescent triangles.77 As with the prison beard case, recognizing a religious
exemption did not jeopardize public welfare, so religious beliefs could be given
greater consideration than secular beliefs.
CONCLUSION

It may seem surprising that consideration of religion should not change the
analysis on the question whether doctors may deny care to patients or parents may
refuse care for their children. The right to practice one's religion is a core
constitutional right.
But there are other key considerations as well. The First Amendment's
establishment clause prohibits government from favoring religion. More
importantly, all constitutional rights must yield when very important public interests
are at stake, as is the case with health care. When balancing all of the equities

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863 (2015).
Id. at 863-65.
Id. at 867.
State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989).
Id.
See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
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involved with access to health care, the role of religious values should parallel the
role of secular values.

